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Abstract—This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD)
strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs)
against power grids. The main idea of the proposed approach
is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask
the effects of their physical attack by actively perturbing the
grid’s transmission line reactances via distributed flexible AC
transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. The proposed MTD
design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links
for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to
detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order
to minimize the defense cost during the system’s operational
time, we formulate a zero-sum game to identify the best subset
of links to perturb (which will provide adequate protection)
against a strategic attacker. The Nash equilibrium robust solution
is computed via exponential weights, which does not require
complete knowledge of the game but only the observed payoff at
each iteration. Extensive simulations performed using the MAT-
POWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness
of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator’s
defense cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber threats against power grids are of increasing concern
due to the deep integration of information and communication
technologies (ICT) into grid operations. In particular, the so-
called coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) can be
dangerously covert. Indeed, while the physical attack involves
disconnecting a transmission line, generator or transformer,
the simultaneous cyber attack plays the role of masking the
physical attack by manipulating the sensor measurements that
are conveyed from the field devices to the control center.
CCPAs can have severe effects on the grid, since undetected
line/generator outages may trigger cascading failures, and have
received significant attention [2], [3], [4], [5].
To defend against CCPAs, recent studies [3] and [5] have
proposed strategies based either on securing a set of measure-
ments (e.g., by encryption) or relying on measurements from
known-secure phasor measurement units (PMU) deployed in
the grid. However, power grids consist of many legacy devices
whose life cycles can last several decades, and incorporating
major security upgrades in these devices can be quite ex-
pensive. Moreover, extensive research has shown that PMUs
themselves are vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) attacks,
which can be launched by spoofing their GPS receivers [6].
In this work, we propose a novel defense strategy to detect
CCPAs based on the moving target defense (MTD) technique.
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As in prior works [2], [3], [4], [5], we consider physical
attacks that disconnect transmission lines. We note that to craft
an undetectable CCPA, the attacker must obtain an accurate
knowledge of the transmission line reactances [3], [5]. The
main idea of the proposed MTD defense in this context is to
invalidate the attacker’s prior acquired knowledge by actively
perturbing of the grid’s line reactance settings. This can be ac-
complished using distributed flexible AC transmission system
(D-FACTS) devices, which are capable of performing active
impedance injection and are being increasingly deployed in
power grids [7]. The proposed MTD defense strategy has the
potential to make it extremely difficult for the attacker to track
the system’s dynamics and gather sufficient information to
craft covert CCPA.
Recent research [8], [9], [10], [11] have studied MTD to
defend the power grid’s state estimation against false data
injection (FDI) attacks. References [8] and [9] proposed a
design criteria to compute MTD perturbations that can detect
FDI attacks effectively. They also showed that effective MTD
perturbations incur a non-trivial operational cost, evaluated in
terms of the grid’s optimal power flow (OPF) cost [8] and the
transmission power losses [9]. The problem of hiding MTD’s
activation from the attacker was considered in [10], which
proposed the so-called hidden MTD. Reference [11] analyzed
how the topology of the power grid impacts the completeness
of MTDs detection capability. Finally, [12] has studied the
deployment of D-FACTS devices to maximize MTD’s attack
detection capability against FDI attacks.
In comparison to these works, the novelty of our work is
two-fold. First, with the exception of our precursor work [1],
none of them have considered MTD to defend against CCPAs.
The solution requires the formulation of novel design criteria
both in terms of D-FACTS placement as well as D-FACTS
perturbation selection. Second, existing works seek to design
MTD that can defend against all potential threats (specifically,
FDI attacks in these papers). However, as we will show in
this work, this may not be necessary, as the impact of a
large number of these attacks are negligible. In fact, MTD’s
operational cost can be significantly reduced by identifying
and defending against only the most important threats. We
formalize this idea in the context of MTD for CCPAs using a
game-theoretic framework. We note that although game theory
has been used in the context of defense against FDI attacks
[13], [14], our work is the first to apply it in the context of
MTD.
We decompose MTD design for CCPAs into two sub-
problems, namely: (i) D-FACTS deployment, and (ii) D-
FACTS operation. In the first subproblem, we seek to find the
best subset of links for D-FACTS deployment that combines
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2the dual criteria of minimizing the system’s OPF cost and
detecting CCPAs. We identify a graph-theoretic criteria to
characterize MTD’s effectiveness against CCPAs. The optimal
subset of links for D-FACTS deployment are found by solving
a feedback edge set problem [15] on the graph associated with
the power grid. The proposed D-FACTS deployment solution
provides the defender with the ability to detect CCPAs against
any transmission line of the grid.
However, an MTD solution that involves perturbing a large
number the branch reactances can be expensive due to the
MTD’s operational cost [8]. Thus, in the second subproblem,
we focus on D-FACTS operation that minimizes the defense
cost. A key observation that enables the cost reduction is
that during the operational time, it may be not necessary
to defend all transmission lines in the grid against CCPAs.
This is because several of these attacks are not impactful,
and hence the attacker is unlikely to target those transmission
lines. For instance, our simulation results show that under a
lightly loaded condition, the impact of CCPAs against many
links in the grid are negligible, whereas under a heavily loaded
condition CCPA against any link causes a significant impact.
Thus the defender must identify the best subset of links that
require protection depending on the operational state of the
system, as well as the perceived threat to those links.
In this context, game theory enables us to anticipate the
attacker’s strategic behaviour and to develop robust defense
policies against CCPAs. We formulate the interaction be-
tween the grid’s defender and attacker entities as a zero-
sum non-cooperative game. Then, in order to compute the
Nash equilibrium (NE) minimax robust solution, we propose
to exploit a reinforcement learning algorithm, namely, the
exponential weights [16]. This iterative algorithm has two
major advantages compared to the known Lemke-Howson
algorithm. First, exponential weights does not require the
perfect and complete knowledge of the game, which is quite
problematic in such adversarial interactions. Second, Lemke-
Howson is a combinatorial algorithm and, although efficient in
practice, it has exponential complexity in the worst case. The
exponential weights is a simple iterative procedure converging
to the solution as O(T−1/2), with T being the horizon of play,
relying solely on the value of the past payoff.
To sum up, the key contributions of this work are as follows:
• First, we formulate the MTD design problem to defend
against CCPAs and identify the MTD design criteria.
• We then propose a solution to the D-FACTS deployment
problem using a graph-theoretic approach. Our solution
identifies the minimum-sized subset of links for D-FACTS
deployment which enables the defender to detect CCPAs
against any transmission line.
• To reduce the operator’s cost of defense during the system’s
operational time, we identify the best subset of links to
perturb that provide adequate protection against strategic
attackers via game theory. For this, we introduce a finite
zero-sum game, which always has a mixed strategy NE
robust solution.
• The NE is computed via a well-known reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm: exponential weights. It has low complexity,
comes with performance guarantees in terms of convergence
and requires little information.
At last, extensive simulations conducted using the MAT-
POWER simulator shows the effectiveness of the proposed
MTD solution in detecting CCPAs. Moreover, our results
show that the game-theoretic approach significantly reduces
the operator’s defense cost.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a power grid characterized by a graph
G = (N ,L), where N = {1, . . . , N} is the set of buses and
L = {1, . . . , L} is the set of transmission lines. At bus i,
we denote the amount of generation and load by Gi and Li
respectively. We let l = {i, j} denote a transmission line
l ∈ L that connects bus i and bus j and its reactance by
xl. The power flowing on the corresponding line l is denoted
by Fl, which under the DC power flow model is given by
Fl =
1
xl
(θi − θj), where θi and θj are the voltage phase
angles at buses i, j ∈ N respectively. In vector form, the
power flow vector f = [F1, . . . , FL]T is related to the voltage
phase angle vector θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ] as f = DATθ, where
the matrix A ∈ RN×L is the branch-bus incidence matrix and
D ∈ RL×L is a diagonal matrix of the reciprocals of link
reactances. We denote the set of links on which D-FACTS
devices are deployed by LD where LD ⊆ L. D-FACTS
devices enable the reactances of these lines to be varied within
a pre-defined range [xmin,xmax], where xmin,xmax are the
reactance limits achievable by the D-FACTS devices. Note
that xminl = x
max
l = xl,∀l ∈ L \ LD.
Optimal Power Flow: For any given load condition l =
[L1, . . . , LN ], the system operator sets the generation dispatch
and line reactance settings by solving the optimal power flow
(OPF) problem, stated as follows:
COPF = min
g,x
∑
i∈N
Ci(Gi) (1a)
s.t. g − l = Bθ, (1b)
f ∈ F ,g ∈ G,x ∈ X , (1c)
where Ci(·) is the generation cost at bus i ∈ N . Equa-
tion (1a) is the nodal power balance constraint, where the
matrix B = ADAT . Constraints (1c) correspond to the
branch power flows, generator limits, and D-FACTS limits,
respectively, where F = [−fmax, fmax],G = [gmin,gmax] and
X = [xmin,xmax] and fmax is the maximum permissible line
power flow (i.e., the thermal limit) and gmin,gmax are the
generator limits. We note that in the absence of D-FACTS,
OPF optimizes over the generator dispatch values only.
State Estimation & Bad Data Detection: The system state,
i.e., the voltage phase angles θ, are estimated from the
noisy sensor measurements using the state estimation (SE)
technique. The sensor measurements, which we denote by z ∈
RM , correspond to the nodal power injections, and the forward
and reverse branch power flows, i.e. z = [p˜, f˜ ,−f˜ ]T and M is
the total number of measurements, where M = N + 2L. We
denote the sensor measurement noises by a vector n ∈ RM ,
which is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution. Under the
DC power flow model, the relationship between θ and z is
given by z = Hθ + n, where H ∈ RM×N is the system’s
measurement matrix given by H = [DAT ;−DAT ;ADAT ].
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Fig. 1: An example of a 4 bus power grid.
The maximum likelihood (ML) technique is used for system
state estimation. Under ML estimation, the estimate θ̂ is
related to the measurements z as θ̂ = (HTWH)−1HTWz,
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix whose elements are
reciprocals of the variances of the sensor measurement noise
components.
After state estimation, a bad data detector (BDD) computes
the residual, which we denote by r, as r = ||z − Hθ̂||. A
bad data alarm is flagged if the residual exceeds a predefined
threshold τ. The threshold is adjusted to ensure that the false
positive (FP) rate does not exceed α, where α > 0 (usually a
small value close to zero).
Undetectable False Data Injection Attacks: We denote the
FDI attack vector by a ∈ RM , which the attacker injects into
the sensor measurements and the measurement vector with the
FDI attack by za, given by za = z + a. It has been shown
[17] that an FDI attack of the form a = Hc, where c ∈ RN ,
remains undetected by the BDD. Specifically, the probability
of detection for such attacks is equal to the FP rate α. We call
these attacks undetectable FDI attacks.
Coordinated Cyber and Physical Attack: While an FDI
attack only modifies the sensor measurements, a CCPA attacks
the grid physically followed by a coordinated FDI attack on
the sensor measurements, mentioned above. In particular, we
consider physical attacks that disconnect a set of transmission
lines, e.g., by opening the line circuit breakers. The physical
attack will alter the power grid’s topology and power flow, and
the mismatch between the pre-attack (i.e., line disconnections)
and post-attack measurements can generally be detected by the
BDD. However, it has been shown that if the attacker injects
a carefully-constructed coordinated FDI attack on the sensor
measurements, then the effect of the physical attack on the
BDD residual can be completely masked [5]. Hence, the attack
remains undetected by the BDD.
Denote the set of links disconnected by the attacker under
a physical attack by LA. We use the subscript “p” to denote
the power grid parameters following the physical attack. It
can be shown that the grid measurements post physical attack
are related to the pre-attack measurements by zp = z + ap,
where ap = H∆θ + ∆Hθp, where ∆H is the change in
the measurement matrix before and after the physical attack,
given by, ∆H = H−Hp. As shown in [5], in order to mask
the effect of the physical attack and remain undetected by the
BDD, the attacker must inject a coordinated FDI attack of the
form a = ∆Hθp.
Knowledge Required to Launch a CCPA: Next, we enlist
the knowledge required by the attacker to construct an FDI
attack of the form a = ∆Hθp. Assume that the attacker
disconnects a single branch LA = {l} that connects buses
i and j. It can be easily verified that ∆H depends on the
tripped branch reactance xl only. Therefore, to construct the
attack a = ∆Hθp, the attacker must obtain knowledge of the
branch reactance xl and the difference in phase angles of the
buses i and j following the physical attack, i.e., θi,p−θj,p [5].
The knowledge of θi,p − θj,p can be obtained by monitoring
the line power flows following the physical attack as follows:
θi,p − θj,p = −
∑
m∈pkl
xlmFlm,p, (2)
where pkl is any alternative path between nodes i and j in
the residual power network following the physical disconnec-
tions, i.e., L \ LA. Each path pkl in turn is a collection of
links pkl = {lk1 , lk2 , . . . , lkM } such that src(lk1) = i and
dst(lkM ) = j, and kM is the number of links in the path
pkl . We denote by Pl = {p1l , p2l , . . . , pKll } a collection of
all alternative paths between buses i and j, where Kl is the
number of such alternative paths. Note that the subscript l
denotes the disconnected link.
In the IEEE-4 bus example shown in Fig. 1, assume that
the attacker disconnects link 1. After the disconnection, there
are two alternative paths between buses 1 and 4, and hence,
K1 = 2. These paths are given by p1l = {2, 3, 4} with k1 = 3
and p2l = {5, 4} with k2 = 2. The attacker can compute the
phase angle difference between nodes 1 and 2 using (2) as
θ1,p− θj2p = − (x2F2,p + x3F3,p + x4F4,p) or, θ1,p− θj2p =
− (x5F5,p + x4F4,p) .
The attacker can obtain the knowledge of power flows Flm,p
in (2) by monitoring the line flow sensor measurements. The
line reactances xlm can be learned by monitoring the grid
power flows over a period of time using existing techniques
[18]. The attacker can also learn the reactance of the discon-
nected branch xl similarly.
III. MOVING-TARGET DEFENSE FOR CCPAS
In this work, we propose a solution to defend the system
against CCPAs based on the MTD technique. The main idea
behind this approach is to periodically perturb the branch
reactances of certain transmission lines to invalidate the at-
tacker’s acquired knowledge. Hence, an attack constructed
using outdated knowledge of the system can be detected by
the BDD. In this section, we first formalize the MTD design
problem to defend against CCPAs.
Recall from (2) that to construct an undetectable CCPA,
the attacker must acquire the following: (i) knowledge of the
reactance of the tripped branch, xl, and (ii) knowledge of
branch reactances in at-least one alternate paths pkl between
the nodes i and j. Therefore, under MTD, the defender can
thwart the CCPA by invalidating one of the two:
C1. Invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of the tripped branch’s
reactance xl.
C2. Invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of at-least one of the
branches in the path pkl between nodes i and j.
Note that the defender cannot have prior knowledge of which
link the attacker chooses to disconnect. Moreover, for a
disconnected link l, the defender has no way of knowing which
path pkl ∈ Pl the attacker may have used to compute the phase
4angle difference θi,p − θj,p as in (2). Thus, the defender must
invalidate the attacker’s knowledge of the reactance of at-least
one link in every path pkl ∈ Pl. The defender must do so for
every link l ∈ L (such that the attacker cannot launch a CCPA
by disconnecting any link in the grid).
To sum up, the MTD perturbation selection problem can be
stated as follows:
Problem 1 (MTD design). For each branch l ∈ L, invalidate
the knowledge of at-least one of the branches in {l}∪pkl , k =
1, . . . ,Kl.
This problem poses constraints on the D-FACTS deploy-
ment set LD, since a preliminary requirement to invalidate
the attacker’s knowledge of a branch reactance is the presence
of a D-FACTS device on that link. Thus, LD must be chosen
in a way that it gives the defender the ability to protect every
link l ∈ L. A trivial solution is to deploy a D-FACTS device on
every link of the power grid. However, a system operator may
wish to minimize the number of D-FACTS devices installed
in order to minimize the device deployment cost.
On the other hand, MTD perturbations also incur an opera-
tional cost for the defender as shown in [8]. Indeed, perturbing
the reactances of a large number of links may be expensive.
Thus, at the system’s operational time, the defender may wish
to perturb the reactances of only a subset of links, which we
denote by LDw , where LDw ⊆ LD, such that the attacker
cannot launch CCPAs against some specific links that are
perceived to be critical and vulnerable.
In what follows, we provide solutions to both the afore-
mentioned aspects of MTD design problem. Specifically, in
Section IV, we first present an algorithm to find the D-FACTS
deployment set LD that satisfies the MTD design problem
with a minimum number of devices based on a graph-theoretic
approach. Subsequently, in Section V, we present a solution to
the problem of selecting a subset of links LDw for reactance
perturbation at the operational time based on a game-theoretic
approach.
IV. D-FACTS DEPLOYMENT SOLUTION
In the absence of defense consideration, D-FACTS are tra-
ditionally deployed in the grid with an objective of minimizing
the cost of operation [19]. In this work, we seek to find the D-
FACTS deployment set LD that balances the dual objectives
of defense against CCPAs and minimizing the OPF cost.
Specifically, LD must satisfy the following criteria: (i) LD
must meet the CCPA detection conditions listed in Section III
and the number of links in in LD, denoted by |LD|, must be
minimal; and (ii) LD must achieve the least OPF cost.
First, we consider the problem of finding LD that satisfies
(i) above. For this, the key observation is that each set of
links {l} ∪ pkl , k = 1, . . . , kM , forms a loop in the graph
G. In Figure 1, assuming that the attacker disconnects link
1, the links {1} ∪ {2, 3, 4} and {1} ∪ {4, 5} form loops in
the corresponding graph. If D-FACTS devices are installed on
a subset of links in the graph such that every loop contains
at least one D-FACTS link, then the attacker cannot launch
an undetectable CCPA. In graph-theoretic terms, the problem
is equivalent to removing a subset of links in the network
such that the residual graph has no loops. For optimized
deployment, LD must contain the minimum number of links.
The set LD can be found by solving the feedback edge set
problem in an undirected graph [15]. The solution proceeds
by finding the spanning trees of the graph G. Let Lsptr denote
a spanning tree of G. If D-FACTS devices are installed on the
links L \Lsptr, then the attacker cannot find a loop within the
graph whose branches do not have a D-FACTS device. Equiv-
alently, the attacker cannot launch an undetectable CCPA.
Further, by definition, every spanning tree in a connected graph
contain precisely N−1 links and, hence, L\Lsptr contains the
minimum number of links that can be disconnected and satisfy
(i). Thus, the D-FACTS deployment set is LD = L \ Lsptr.
The graph G might have multiple spanning trees, which
imply multiple subsets of links LD satisfy (i). A natural
question is: which of these LD must be chosen for D-
FACTS deployment? To answer this question, we consider the
secondary problem of cost minimization described in (ii) .
In the absence of defense consideration, reference [19] pro-
posed an approach to find LD that minimizes the transmission
losses by choosing the set of links for D-FACTS deployment
that have the highest power loss to impedance sensitivity
factors. We adopt a similar approach in this work. Since the
primary interest of this work is the OPF cost, we compute
the OPF cost to impedance (OCI) sensitivity factor for each
link, i.e., dCOPF/dxl. Then, installing a D-FACTS device on
the links with the greatest absolute values of dCOPF/dxl will
achieve the least OPF cost.
With the MTD consideration, this approach must be modi-
fied to select the set of links that have the highest OCI sensi-
tivity values while satisfying the attack detection conditions.
This can be accomplished by converting G to a weighted graph,
where the link weights are their OCI sensitivity factors. Then,
among all sets LD that satisfy (i), we must select the set that
has the greatest sum of link weights.
Although the procedure stated above satisfies conditions
(i) and (ii) optimally, listing all the spanning trees of G
can be computationally complex. However, this issue can be
addressed easily. Specifically, we first choose the minimum-
weight spanning tree of the weighted graph, denoted by
Lminsptr. Then setting LD = L\Lminsptr solves both (i) and (ii)
optimally. The D-FACTS deployment algorithm is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: D-FACTS Deployment Set
Data: Power grid graph G = (N ,L)
Result: LD
1 Set the weight of link l ∈ L as dCOPF/dxl.
2 Compute the minimum weight spanning tree Lminsptr of G.
3 Set LD = L \ Lminsptr.
To conclude, consider the D-FACTS deployment set LD
chosen according to Algorithm 1. Assume that the defender
perturbs the reactances of the set of links LDw ⊆ LD. Then,
we have the following:
• A physical attack against a link l can be detected by the
BDD if the links in LDw ensure that the conditions listed
5in Problem 1 are satisfied for that link. We will henceforth
refer to such a link to being “protected” under the MTD
link perturbation set LDw .
• Naturally, based on the arguments stated in this section, if
LDw = LD, then all the links l ∈ L are protected from the
physical attacks.
V. GAME THEORETIC MTD ROBUST STRATEGIES
MTD perturbations incur an operational cost, and perturbing
the reactances of a large set of links may not be cost effective.
Instead, we propose to protect only a subset of links from
physical attacks depending on the operational system state, as
well as the perceived threat to those links. This is approached
using a game-theoretic formulation presented next.
1) Zero-sum Game Formulation: We define the strategic
interactions between the attacker and the defender as a two-
player zero-sum game. To formalize this, we define the game
as a triplet Γ , ({D,A}, {SD,SA}, {uD, uA}) in which the
components are: (i) the set of players {D,A}; (ii) SD and
SA, the sets of actions that defender and attacker can take
respectively; and (iii) the payoffs of the players uk : SD ×
SA → R for k ∈ {D,A}, where uk(sD, sA) measures the
benefit obtained by player k when the action profile that has
been played is s = (sD, sA). In a zero-sum game, the payoffs
are opposite and uA(sD, sA) = −uD(sD, sA) such that a cost
for the defender is a benefit for the attacker and vice-versa.
We denote the attacker’s and the defender’s action sets by
SA = {a0, a1, . . . , aNA−1} and SD = {d0, d1, . . . , dND−1}
respectively, where NA and ND are the cardinality of the sets
SA and SD respectively. The attacker’s action set is the subset
of links it disconnects physically. We denote the set of links
disconnected by the attacker under action ai by Lai , where,
Lai ⊆ L, i = 0, 1, . . . , NA − 1. The action a0 corresponds
to the case when the attacker does not attack any link. The
defender’s action is to select a subset of links within LD whose
reactances will be perturbed. We denote the set of links chosen
by the defender under action di by Ldi , where, Ldi ⊆ LD, i =
1, . . . , ND − 1. The action d0 corresponds to the case when
the defender does not perturb the reactance of any link.
Next, we characterize the payoff ud(sD, sA). If the attacker
disconnects a link l that is protected by the defender (via
MTD), then the CCPA will be detected by the BDD, and
the operator can quickly restore the link to avoid any further
damage. For instance, the defender can quickly restore the
circuit breaker of the disconnected link to a closed position.
On the other hand, if the attacker disconnects a link that is
not protected, then the CCPA will go undetected. The link
disconnection will result in redistribution of power flows.
Consequently, all the links on which the power flows exceeds
the corresponding thermal limits will experience physical
damage, and become temporarily disconnected. In this case,
the operator will have to initiate load shedding to avoid further
damage. Here, we assume that the BDD will detect the attack
once additional links are disconnected, since the attacker’s data
injection will only mask the effect of disconnection of the
first link. We denote the cost of load shedding at bus i by
Ci,s(L
s
i ), where L
s
i (≤ Li) is the quantity of load that is shed,
and ls = [Ls1, . . . , L
s
N ].
Let COPF(am, dn) denote the OPF cost when the attacker
takes an action am and the defender takes an action dn, which
can be computed as follows:
COPF(am, dn) = min
g,ls
∑
i∈N
Ci,g(Gi) + Ci,s(L
s
i ) (3)
s.t. g − l+ ls = Bam,dnθ,
f ∈ F ,g ∈ G,
where Bam,dn is given by Bam,dn = Aam,dnDam,dnA
T
am,dn
.
Here, Aam,dn is the bus-branch connectivity matrix when
the attacker and the defender choose actions am and dn
respectively. These quantities are computed as in Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 2: Payoff Computation
Data: am, dn
Result: COPF(am, dn)
1 Set branch reactances to xdn .
2 Set Aam,dn = Aa0,d0 .
3 Solve (3) to obtain COPF(a0, dn).
4 if attack is successful then
5 Set Aam,dn , Dam,dn by removing the branches Lam .
Solve (3) to compute COPF(am, dn).
6 else
7 Set COPF(am, dn) = COPF(a0, dn).
8 end
Based on the above, the defender’s payoff is given by
uD(sD, sA) =
{
COPF(d0, a0)− COPF(sD, a0), if IS = 0
COPF(d0, a0)− COPF(sD, sA), if IS = 1.
The term IS is an indicator variable to represent the success
(IS = 1) or failure of an attack (IS = 0). Both players aim to
choose their actions such that their own payoff is maximized
and we can see that the two players have contradictory
objectives.
The above payoffs can be explained by looking at them
as negative costs. First, COPF(d0, a0) denotes the benchmark
operating cost of the defender when none of the players
takes an action to either disrupt or defend the system. The
term COPF(sD, sA)− COPF(d0, a0) denotes the the additional
cost incurred by the defender and caused by a successful
attack, when the attacker chooses sA and the defender chooses
sD. The term COPF(sD, a0) − COPF(d0, a0) represents the
additional cost incurred by the defender for choosing an action
sD against an unsuccessful attack sA. Hence, the aim of the
defender is to minimize these costs, whereas the attacker will
seek to maximize them.
2) Nash Equilibrium Solution: In such an interactive sit-
uation, the natural solution is the Nash equilibrium (NE).
However, the game Γ above is discrete and finite and may
not have a NE solution in pure strategies. Instead, it always
has at least one mixed-strategy NE [20], which is the NE of its
extension to mixed strategies. The latter is defined as follows:
Γ˜ , ({D,A}, {∆D,∆A}, {u˜D, u˜A}). The action sets of the
extended game Γ˜ are the probability simplices of dimension
Nk, k ∈ {D,A}: ∆k =
{
pk ∈ RNk+
∣∣∣∑Nkj=0 pk,j = 1} where
pk = (pk,0, . . . , pk,Nk−1) is the discrete probability vector of
player k such that pD,j and pA,j represent the probability of
6choosing the action dj by the defender and the probability
of choosing the action aj by the attacker, respectively. The
modified payoffs are simply the resulting expected payoffs
following the randomization of play:
u˜k(pD, pA) =
ND−1∑
j=0
NA−1∑
i=0
uk(dj , ai) pD,j pA,i. (4)
The mixed NE is a stable state to unilateral deviations,
which means that no player can benefit by deviating from
their NE strategy individually.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (p∗D, p∗A) is a mixed NE
for the game Γ, iff the following conditions are met:
u˜D(p
∗
D, p
∗
A) ≥ u˜D(pD, p∗A), ∀ pD ∈ ∆D, and u˜A(p∗D, p∗A) ≥
u˜A(p
∗
D, pA), ∀ pA ∈ ∆A.
Computing the NE is a well-known difficult problem: the
Lemke-Howson algorithm is the best combinatorial algorithm
[21] and is PSPACE-complete. In the worst case scenario, it
performs as poorly as exhaustive search (complexity grows
exponential with the dimension of the action profile set), but
in general it can be quite efficient.
Aside from complexity, the major drawback of the Lemke-
Howson algorithm is that it requires perfect and complete
information of the game G at both players. In an adversarial
setting, assuming that the players know precisely the action
sets of their opponent and the payoff function is not realistic.
Instead, we suggest to exploit iterative learning processes that
allow the players to compute their NE strategies by learning
from their past interactions.
3) Machine Learning to Solve the Game: We focus here
on the exponential weights for exploration and exploitation
(EXP3) algorithm, also known as the multiplicative weights,
which is a ubiquitous iterative decision process that has been
repeatedly discovered in machine learning, optimization and
game theory [16], [22]; having wide applications such as: Ad-
aBoost for classification and prediction [23], pooling problems
for blending industries [24], graphical model learning [25],
and learning the NE in certain types of games [16], [26] (e.g.,
potential games, two-player zero-sum games, etc.).
The main idea is that, at each iteration t, the decision
agent k chooses a random action sk,t following the probability
distribution pk,t = [pk,t(s)]s∈Sk . As a result, the agent
observes the value of its payoff: uk(sk,t, s−k,t), based on
which the cumulative scores of all actions are updated. Since
only the payoff of the realized action can be observed, we
have to estimate the payoffs of the unplayed ones. For this,
the following pseudo-estimator can be built, for any s ∈ Sk
uˆk,t(s) =
uk(sk,t, s−k,t)I{s = sk,t}+ βt
pk,t(s)
(5)
where the first term, uk(s, s−k,t)I{s = sk,t}/pk,t(s) is known
as importance sampling and represents an unbiased estimator
of uk(s, s−k,t) for any s at time t. To control the variance of
this estimator, the bias βt > 0 is introduced [16].
The cumulative score of action s is defined as: Gk,t(s) =∑t
τ=1 ητ uˆk,τ (s), which measures how well the explored ac-
tions have performed in the past. Then, these cumulative scores
are mapped on the probability simplex via a well chosen
exponential map
pk,t+1(s) = γt
1
|Sk|+(1−γt)
exp(Gk,t(s))∑
r∈Sk exp(Gk,t(r))
, ∀s, (6)
where γt ∈ (0, 1] and ηt > 0 are learning parameters
and |Sk| denotes the cardinal of the set Sk. Intuitively, this
means that the actions that have been performed well in the
past are played with relatively higher probability, without
discarding completely poor or unexplored actions that may
perform well in the future; this illustrates the data exploration
vs. exploitation tradeoff. The updated probability distribution
pk,t+1 will hence be used by player k to generate the random
action at the next iteration t + 1 and so on. The details are
provided in Algorithm 3 below.
ALGORITHM 3: EXP3 to compute the NE at player k
Data: γt, βt, ηt, uk(sk,t, s−k,t)
Result: pk,t
1 Initialize t = 1, pk,1(s) = 1|Sk| , Gk,0(s) = 0 for all s ∈ Sk
2 while pk,t has not converged do
3 Draw random action sk,t following distribution pk,t
4 Observe payoff uk(sk,t, sk,−t)
5 Compute pseudo-estimations uˆk,t(s), ∀s ∈ Sk as in eq. (5)
6 Update cumulative scores:
Gk,t(s) = Gk,t−1(s) + ηt uˆk,t(s), ∀s ∈ Sk
7 Update probability distribution pk,t+1 as in eq. (6)
8 Compute empirical frequency pk,t as in (7)
9 Step t← t+ 1
10 end
Notice that the three parameters of the algorithm: βt, γt, and
ηt have to be very carefully tuned. Indeed βt > 0 controls the
bias vs. variance tradeoff of the payoff estimator uˆk,t(s),∀s
necessary because of the limited information available to
player k. Indeed, only the value of the payoff uk(sk,t, s−k,t)
is observed while the opponent’s action s−k,t is unknown.
The parameters γt ∈ (0, 1] and ηt > 0 impact the
exploration vs. exploitation tradeoff. For γt = 1 (or η  1)
there is no data exploitation but pure exploration (no learning
from past results), as the actions are drawn following the
uniform distribution; whereas for γt  1, the exploration term
is reduced in favour of the exponential weights. For ηt  1,
the algorithm stops exploring at the first chosen action.
In [16], it was shown that the EXP3 algorithm above
converges to the mixed Nash equilibria. The theoretical result
is reported below as in [27], for the sake of simplicity.
Proposition 1. If each player of the zero-sum game Γ runs
the EXP3 algorithm with parameters:
γt =
√|Sk| log |Sk|/t, ηt ≈ βt = √2 log |Sk|/(t|Sk|), then
their empirical frequencies
pk,t =
1∑t
τ=1 ητ
t∑
τ=1
ητpk,τ (7)
converge asymptotically to the set of the mixed NEs. The
convergence rate is O(T−1/2), where T is the horizon of play.
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Fig. 2: Attack detection probability as a function of the
percentage change (η) in the link reactance.
The major advantage of the EXP3 algorithm is the fact that
it does not require the players to know the utility functions
(implying also the knowledge of the adversary’s action set)
neither the actions chosen by their adversary.
On the downside, the convergence speed cannot be im-
proved in the adversarial setting because of the limited
available information [16]. However, for smart grid MTD
application this is not a major issue, as the time period between
successive MTD perturbations can be reasonably long (e.g., in
[8], we show that hourly MTD perturbations might be realistic
for practical systems). Moreover, we assume that the system
state remains constant throughout the interaction.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
Below, we present our simulation results, performed with
the MATPOWER toolbox, to show the effectiveness of the
proposed defense.
a) MTD Attack Detection: First, we examine the MTD’s
capability in detecting CCPAs using IEEE 14-, 39- and
118-bus systems. As proposed in Section IV, we solve the
minimum weight feedback edge set problem for the graph
corresponding to the IEEE bus system and determine LD.
Since there is no closed form expression for the weights
dCOPF/dxl, we compute them by simulations. We then perturb
the reactances of all the links in the set LD. We simulate
physical attacks against a randomly chosen link in the bus
system and inject a corresponding CCPA of the form a =
∆Hθp, where both ∆H and θp are computed using outdated
knowledge of the system.
We plot the BDD’s attack detection probability for each
case in Fig. 2 as a function of the percentage change in
line reactances. It can be observed that the CCPAs can be
detected with high probability. We also enlist the size of the D-
FACTS deployment sets (that can detect any CCPA) in Table I.
The proposed approach enables the defender to protect the
power grid with relatively few D-FACTS devices. We can also
conclude that |LD| depends on the grid’s actual topology and
not just on its size (e.g., |LD| = 15 for the 24 bus system,
whereas |LD| = 9 for the 39-bus system).
b) NE-efficiency in Reducing the MTD Cost: We show
the efficiency of the game-theoretic solution in reducing the
operator’s defense cost. The simulations are done on a IEEE-
14 bus system. The generation cost is assumed to be linear,
i.e., Ci(Gi,t) = ciGi,t. The generators’ capacities at buses
1, 2, 3, 6, 8 are Gmax = 300, 50, 30, 50, 20 MWs
Bus system |L| |LD|
IEEE 9-bus system 9 1
IEEE 14-bus system 20 7
IEEE 24-bus system 38 15
IEEE 39-bus system 36 8
IEEE 118-bus system 186 62
TABLE I: Size of the D-FACTS deployment set |LD|.
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Fig. 3: Convergence of p¯k,t to the NE for IEEE-14 bus system.
Left: Heavily loaded system. Right: Lightly loaded system.
Load scenario NE D-FACTS
perturbation set
(Lemke-Howson)
NE
defense
cost
Full
defense
cost
Scenario 1 {1,3,5,8,9,18,19} 9.85 % 9.85 %
Scenario 2 {1 } 0.8 % 4.37 %
TABLE II: D-FACTS perturbation set and defense cost (the
% increase in OPF cost) at the NE for different system loads.
and ci = 20, 30, 40, 50, 35 $/MWh respectively. fmax
is chosen to be 160 MWs for link 1, and 60 MWs for all
other links. We consider two scenarios: (1) heavily loaded
system, with the load values at Bus 1 to 14 given by
0, 21.7, 94.2, 47.8, 7.6, 11.2, 0, 0, 29.5, 9, 3.5, 6.1, 13.5,
14.9 MWs respectively, and (2) lightly loaded system, with the
load values at Bus 1 to 6 0, 80, 44.2, 47.8, 30, 11.2 MWs
respectively and zero loads at Bus 7 to 14. We consider
five MTD perturbation strategies for the defender, i.e., d1 =
{1}, d2 = {1, 3}, d3 = {1, 3, 5}, d4 = {1, 3, 5, 8}, d5 =
{1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 18, 19}. We note that d5 = LD, which protects
all the links of the system from CCPA. In each case, we perturb
the link reactance by 15% of their original values. The attacker
in turn launches a CCPA by disconnecting one of the links at a
time. Under this set-up, we compute the NE solution according
to EXP3 algorithm, with γt = βt = 0 and ηt = 0.01.
The evolution of p¯k,t in the two scenarios are shown in
Fig. 3. First, we have verified that the EXP3 and the Lemke-
Howson algorithm (based on complete and perfect game
knowledge) lead to the same NE solution, which validates
our approach. Then, the convergence rate of EXP3 is also
reasonably fast (within 104 iterations). Furthermore, it can be
observed that the NE robust solution depends on the system
load. While, in the heavily loaded scenario, all the links in
LD need to be perturbed, in the lightly loaded scenario, it is
sufficient to perturb the reactance of link 1 only. The rationale
is that in the lightly loaded scenario, only a subset of links
need to be protected from physical attacks, since the attacker
is unlikely to target the unimportant links (i.e., the links that
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Fig. 4: Attack detection probability as a function of the %
change (η) in the link reactance, for an AC power flow model.
have very little power flow).
In Table II, we also list the defense cost as the percentage
increase in the OPF cost over its optimal value (by solving
(1)). The NE solution of scenario 2 incurs much lower defense
cost, since only a subset of links are perturbed. The above
experiments show that the MTD perturbation set depends on
the operational state of the system. Also, by exploiting the NE
solution, the operator can reduce its defense cost.
c) MTD under the AC Power Flow Model: We also
examine the effectiveness of the proposed MTD designed
according to the DC power flow model in detecting CCPA
attacks under an AC model. The measurement model is given
by z = h(v) + n, where the function h(v) is a non-linear
mapping between the system state (including both voltage
magnitudes and phase angles in AC power flow) and the
measurements. Following a physical attack, the measurements
will change to zp = h(vp)+n, where vp are the bus voltages
following the physical attack. A cyber attack of the form
a = z− zp will mask the effect of physical attack.
In our simulations, we perturb the reactances of the links
in LD (as in Section IV). The cyber attack component, a,
is computed based on the outdated knowledge of the line
reactances. An AC state estimation and BDD module are also
implemented. The results reported in Fig. 4, show that MTD
is effective in detecting CCPAs in an AC power flow model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have proposed a novel strategy to detect
CCPAs based on MTD and presented MTD design criteria
in this context. We have identified the subset of links for D-
FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect
physical attacks against any link in the system. Further, to
reduce the operator’s defense cost, we have identified the
optimal set of links whose reactances must be perturbed at
the operational time based on a game-theoretic approach. We
showed that the robust solution against a strategic attacker can
be computed efficiently exploiting a well-known algorithm in
reinforcement learning, which has low complexity and requires
little information.
Future work include optimal MTD defense against CCPAs
for an AC power flow model, unified D-FACTS placement
solution for CCPAs and FDI attacks, as well as accounting for
the power grid dynamics via online optimization and learning.
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